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1 NOTES AND COMMENTS
the weight of such a consideration, when cast upon the scales in a
worthless check case, would line up with caveat emptor, both being
opposed to the negotiability of goods, and operate to deprive the innocent
purchaser of the goods. The result is an anomalous situation wherein
the security of acquisitions, rather than security of transactions, lends
its support to the free movement of trade.
WILLIS C. BUMGARNER.
Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act-Servcemens' Suits
In 1946 Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act.1 This
legislation is a sweeping waiver of governmental immunity from suits
sounding in tort.2 The Act makes the United States liable on "claims
for injury or loss of property or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
iul act or omission of any employee of the government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable .... " The Gov-
ernment is not to be liable in twelve enumerated instances. Among these
specific "exceptions" is a provision that the Act is to have no application
to "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 4  The Act
makes no mention of veterans' or servicemens' claims except for the
indirect reference implicit in the language of this exception.
What is the status then of the serviceman-claimant under the Act?
The Supreme Court was faced with this question in Brooks v. U. S.5
Two soldiers, Welker and Arthur Brooks, were riding in an automobile
when they were hit at a highway intersection by an Army truck. At
the time of the accident the men were on leave and about their own
private affairs. It was held that the fact that plaintiffs were servicemen
would not preclude the maintenance of a suit under the Tort Claims
Act.6 "The statute's terms are clear," wrote Mr. Justice Murphy.
128 U. S. C. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1948).
This legislation seems to have been passed with two main purposes in mind:(1) to relieve an over-burdened Congress from the necessity of considering hun-
dreds of private bills yearly (the only remedy available to the private citizen
before passage of the Act), and (2) to remove the previous barrier to suit against
the Government in tort, a reform which had been sought by statesmen and jurists
for more than a century. See generally, Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26
N. C. L. REv. 119 (1948) ; Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Fed-
eral Government, 47 Col- L. Rnv. 722 (1947) ; Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims
Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L. J. 1 (1946) ; Note, 20 Miss. L. J. 354
(1949).
328 U. S. C. §1346(b) (1948).
'28 U. S. C. §2680 (1948). The exceptions fall loosely into two categories:
(1) claims which relate to certain governmental activities which should be free
from the threat of damage suit, or (2) claims for which adequate remedies are
already available. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
69 S. Ct. 918 (1949).
Accord, Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mont. 1948)(death of officer in the military forces killed in plane crash while being trans-
1949]
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"They provide for District Court jurisdiction over any claim founded
on negligence brought against the United States. We are not persuaded
that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that of servicemen.' " All but two
of the tort claims bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1935s
had contained a clause excepting claims cognizable under either the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act9 or the World War Veterans'
Act of 1924.10 The Act of 1946 contained such an exception when
introduced ;" but the provision, without ascertainable explanation, was
dropped from the Act as adopted.1 2 It seems apparent from both the
language and the legislative history of the Act that Congress did not
intend to place such claims beyond the Act's coverage.13
It had been argued by the Government that since there already ex-
isted an elaborate and adequate system of pensions and benefits for
servicemen,"4 it had not been intended to include such claims within
the framework of the Act. But the Court said that there is nothing in
the Act or the veterans' laws which provides for exclusiveness of rem-
edy.15 The Government then objected to recovery on the ground that
it would put the United States in the position of having to pay twice
for the same injury-the plaintiff Welker Brooks having been awarded
a disability allowance of $27.60 per month, and the mother of the de-
ceased Arthur Brooks having been paid a death benefit of $468 under
the Veterans' Act. The Court made it plain, however, that it would
not permit a double recovery, and the case was remanded to the Court
of Appeals for its consideration of the problem of reducing the dam-
ages pro tanto. In other words, the substantial recovery obtained by
the plaintiffs in the District Court 6 might be diminished by the modest
amounts already paid out in the form of benefits under the Veterans'
ported to Seattle where he was to be discharged) ; Samson v. U. S., 79 F. Supp.
406 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) (death of Army private whose injuries, not incident to
military service, were sustained when he was a passenger on a bus operated by
the War Dep't.).
"Brooks v. U. S., 69 S. Ct. 918, 919 (1949).
"For citation of these bills, see Brooks v. U. S., 69 S. Ct. 918 n. 2 (1949).
'39 STAT. 742 (1916), 5 U. S. C. §751 et seq. (1946).
1043 STAT. 607 (1924), 38 U. S. C. §§421-576 (1946).
I" H. R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
1The exceptions became §421 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 28
U. S. C. §2680 (1948).
" See Judge John J. Parker, dissenting in U. S. v. Brooks, 169 F. 2d 840, 846
(4th Cir. 1948).
1' These laws are too numerous to be cited individually. See generally, KM-
BROUGE ANiD GLEN, AmERICAN LAW OF VETERANS (1946).
" Contra, Perucki v. U. S., 80 F. Supp. 959 (M. D. Pa. 1948); Wham v.
U. S., 81 F. Supp. 126 (D. D. C. 1948), where it is said: "When the United
States consents to be sued in tort, as it has by the Tort Claims Act, those mem-
bers of a class for which a comprehensive system of compensation has otherwise
been provided may not seek benefits under the Act."
" Welker was awarded $4,000; Arthur's estate $25,000.
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Act.17 It had also been argued that where a claimant has received
compensation under either the Federal Employees' Compensation Act or
the Veterans' Act, this would constitute an election of remedies and that
recovery under the Tort Claims Act would therefore be barred.'8 But
the Court said, "We will not call either remedy exclusive, nor pro-
nounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not done
so."' 9 And so the serviceman may accept compensation under the Vet-
erans' Act and then proceed under the Tort Claims Act. Thus the more
generous award is made available to the claimant.
The Brooks case is controlling only in cases in which the injuries
are not incident to military service. The Court stated: "Were the acci-
dent incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be
presented. '20 We can only speculate as to the result the Court will
reach when it is squarely faced with a case in which the plaintiff's in-
juries are incident to his service. The literal language of the Act could
easily embrace such injuries. The only section which feasibly could
apply to claims of the serviceman is Section 2680(j) which excepts all
claims "arising from combatant activities . . .during time of war." 21
Certainly there remains between the decision in the Brooks case and
the literal language of Section 2680(j) a wide area of possible claims.
Some of the lower courts have already probed into this twilight
zone. The District Court for the District of Maryland dealt with the
problem of a service-connected injury in Jefferson v. U. S.22 There
an ex-soldier sued the United States for injuries sustained in an opera-
tion performed on him by an Army surgeon. A towel 23/2 feet long by
132 feet wide was negligently left in the plaintiff's abdomen and was
" Just before press time the two Brooks cases were considered on remand.
U. S. v. Brooks, 176 F. 2d 482 (1949). The case of the deceased Arthur was
disposed of, the Court deducting the $468 death benefit payment but refusing to
deduct payments made through National Service Life Insurance. The case of
the injured Welker was remanded to the District Court for further findings of
fact since it did not appear to what extent, in making the award of damages, the
District Judge took into account hospital and medical expenses and disability
benefits.
"8 This argument is developed in Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 35
GEo. L. J. 1, 57 (1946). In Parr v. U. S.,'78 F. Supp. 693 (D. Kan. 1948), a
Government employee who had accepted compensation under the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act later brought action under the Tort Claims Act. Held:
acceptance of compensation under the former Act constituted an "election," and
the present action was therefore barred. Cf. White v. U. S., 77 F. Supp. 316
(D. N. J. 1948), where employees of the War Dep't. recovered under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act before the effective d te of the Tort Claims Act.
Held: this did not constitute a waiver or an "election."
" Brooks v. U. S., 69 S. Ct. 918, 920 (1949).
20 Ibid.
"In Skeels v. U. S., 72 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. La. 1947), "combatant activ-
ities" was defined as actual conflict, not mere training activities, and plaintiff was
permitted to recover for death of his intestate (a civilian) who was killed when
an iron object fell from an Army plane engaged in tow target practice over the
Gulf of Mexico.
"'77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948).
1949]
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discovered nine months later when a similar operation was performed at
Johns Hopkins. The complaint was dismissed. Relying on House and Sen-
ate Committee Reports23 and after a consideration of the probable con-
sequences of allowing such suits, the court reasoned that Congress had not
contemplated the inclusion of claims for service-connected injury. In a
more recent case, Santana v. U. S.,2 4 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held, on the basis of the decision in the Brooks case, that the
district court had jurisdiction, under the Tort Claims Act, of an action
for wrongful death of a discharged serviceman whose death was alleg-
edly caused by the negligence of Government employees at a Veterans
Administration Hospital. Here the deceased was not in service at the
time of the negligence complained of, and the court felt that inclusion
of the claim could involve no problem of the "subversion of military
discipline. ' 25  The Court further said, "With respect to the argument,
that Congress presumably did not intend to include discharged veterans
within the coverage of the Tort Claims Act, in so far as they already
are covered by a 'comprehensive system of special statutory benefits,'
the Supreme Court in its decision in the Brooks case ... expressly dis-
credited that argument, even as applied to servicemen. '20
In Perucki v. U. S. a United States district court sitting in Penn-
sylvania denied reeovery to a veteran seeking damages for an injury
allegedly received when he was undergoing examination in connection
with an appeal from a decision reducing his rate of disability. Plain-
tiff said he had received painful burns when a Veterans Administration
doctor tested his reflexes by applying lighted matches to both knees.
The court held the claim to be within the "combatant activities" ex-
ception because "the basis of the claim could not have arisen if it had
not been for the injury which the plaintiff sustained while engaged in
the combatant activities of the military forces. '28  Since the negligence
complained of occurred after discharge, it seems that the court came up
with a very strained construction of the exception in order to disallow
the plaintiff's claim.2 9
"SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946) ; H. R. REP. No. 1287,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1946).
2,4175 F. 2d 320 (1st Cir. 1949).
2;In U. S. v. Brooks, 169 F. 2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), the majority says at
845: "If soldiers could sue for such injuries as illness based on the alleged negli-
gence of the company cook or mess sergeant, or if soldiers who contract sickness
on wintry sentry duty had a right of action against the Government on the allega-
tion of a negligent order given by the company commander, then the traditional
grousing of the American soldier would result in the devastation of military dis-
cipline and morale."
20 Santana v. U. S., 175 F. 2d 320, 322 (1st Cir. 1949).
2T80 F. Supp. 959 (M. D. Pa. 1948).
28Id. at 961.
29 The District Court in the Santana case did not file an opinion for pub-
lication. The facts set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals are meager,
and so it is not possible to determine whether the deceased veteran in the Santana
[Vol. 28
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Whatever the approach, whether by a narrowing of the literal lan-
guage of the Act as was done in the Jefferson case, or by a strained in-
terpretation of the "combatant activities" exception as in the Perucki
case, the courts have shown little disposition to push the Government's
liability as far as the literal language of the Act will admit. Undoubt-
edly the courts are concerned with the spectre of the floods of litigation
that will almost surely result if they do not adopt some limitative
criterion. Whether by accident or by design, the decisions to date
indicate a trend toward a criterion akin to that adopted in the Crown
Proceedings Act of 1947,30 the British Act waiving sovereign immunity.
The British Act exempts the Crown from liability when the serviceman
is injured while on duty or when the injury is incurred on military
premises.31 This criterion, if incorporated directly into our Act, would
hardly be open to the often-voiced objection that allowance of service-
men's claims will result in the subversion of military discipline, and at
the same time it would quiet the courts' fears as to the possibility of
floods of litigation.
JAMES L. TAPLY.
case was hospitalized in connection with a former combat injury or for some other
reason. It may be, then, that the Santana and Perucki cases are distinguishable
on the facts. Since the negligence complained of occurred after discharge in both
cases, the original basis for hospitalization or treatment would seem immaterial.
a 10 & 11 GEORGE VI, c. 44, §10 (1947).
ai Barnes, The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, CANr. B. REv. 387, 393 (1948).
19491
